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FOOD SUSTAINABILITY IN THE AGE OF COMPLEX,
GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS 
Steph Tai*
Food production has become more complex over time.  
Moreover, we are producing food in an increasingly global, 
rather than local, manner.  How can demands for sustainability 
be reinforced in this age of complex, global supply chains?  This 
essay focuses on three key features of the modern food supply 
chain: the variety of components, the complexity of the chain 
itself, and diversity of “enforcement” mechanisms in food 
production supply chains.  These features suggest that traditional 
governmental tools (such as command and control measures) 
and contractual tools (such as performance standards) may not 
be sufficient to ensure sustainable production methods. 
Instead, I argue that sustainability advocates should focus 
on identifying points within supply chain systems that they can 
use to leverage greater accountability from the supply chain 
actors with respect to sustainability.  Drawing from Donella 
Meadows’s insights into systems analysis, this essay argues that 
such advocates should devote their efforts towards urging global 
actors to incorporate traceability, transparency, and third-party 
participation mechanisms into their supply chain contracts.  It 
uses various case studies to highlight how—when such 
mechanisms have been incorporated—nongovernmental 
organizations have been able to more effectively ensure the 
sustainability considerations in supply chain governance.  Thus, 
by concentrating on such areas, rather than focusing solely on 
traditional control measures, advocates will be more effective in 
incorporating sustainability into food production processes. 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School.  This essay is
dedicated to Professor Peter Appel, with whom I’ve had so many valuable and insightful 
conversations about private environmental governance.  He is very missed.  
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I.  OUR GLOBAL FOOD SUPPLY CHAINS 
The past few decades have brought a dramatic increase in 
the globalization of food production.  In the United States alone, 
“[a]s recently as the mid-1980s, U.S. agricultural exports and 
imports were valued at less than $30 billion each.  By 2012, 
exports were worth about $135 billion, and imports were 
approaching $105 billion, more than a threefold increase for 
each.”1  These chains are lengthy, and often increasingly 
lengthier as consumers demand more processed foods using 
ingredients that are not seasonal to their locales.2  Moreover, the 
chains for food production have become increasingly complex, 
with “the delivery of a single type of food to a consumer 
involv[ing] many actors.”3 
There are a number of features in global supply chains that 
make them inherently difficult for an individual state actor to 
regulate.  Supply chains often contain a number of components: 
from producers of farm inputs (such as seeds, fertilizers, and 
pesticides), the farms themselves, “first-line handlers” 
(including “for-profit commodity trading companies and farmer 
cooperatives that aggregate the output of individual farms to 
gain economies of scale and market access to the rest of the food 
supply chain”), manufacturers, wholesalers, logistic firms who 
do “not actually assume ownership of the food products but 
[instead] provide the service of logistical distribution and 
inventory coordination,” institutional buyers, retail food stores, 
and food and beverage services.4   When these chains are global, 
these actors can be spread around the world, subject to differing 
types and degrees of regulatory oversight.5 
1. National Academy of Sciences, A Framework for Assessing Effects of the Food
System (2015) [hereinafter Food Systems Framework], available at 
https://www.nap.edu/read/18846/chapter/1, at 63 (internal citations omitted). 
2. Cf. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, The Future of Food
and Agriculture: Trends and Challenges [hereinafter The Future of Food and Agriculture] 
(2017), available at http://www.fao.org/3/a-i6583e.pdf, at 4 (“Food supply chains have 
lengthened dramatically as the physical distance from farm to plate has increased; the 
consumption of processed, packaged and prepared foods has increased in all but the most 
isolated rural communities.”). 
3. Food Systems Framework, supra note 1, at 32.
4. See id. at 32-33. 
5. See Galit A. Sarfaty, Shining Light on Global Supply Chains, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
419, 421 (2015) (“Domestic regulations on supply chains pose a unique compliance 
challenge to companies because these laws operate extraterritorially.”). 
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Moreover, these chains are also often quite complex.6  As 
one study has argued, “[o]wing to the many domains involved 
and the different scales on which different processes take place 
(from households to the global market), food systems are 
inherently highly complex systems: That is, their relevant 
aspects cannot be captured from a single perspective, and 
therefore different stakeholders may have different perceptions 
of what a food system is and how it performs.”7  Such 
complexities can involve differing relationships within various 
spheres: public, scientific, market, and policy.8  A “public” 
analysis involves various public concerns, such as cultural 
considerations and sustainability, about the relationships 
between various components of food supply chains.9  A 
“scientific” analysis involves the factual examination of the 
production chains themselves.10  A “market” analysis involves 
economic assessments of how differing aspects of food supply 
chains are related in terms of pricing and marketing.11  And a 
“policy” analysis involves examinations of how different 
components are related through public regulation and policies.12  
As such, any comprehensive attempt to characterize the 
interrelationships amongst components of food supply chains 
will, by necessity, need to take into account these various 
perspectives on how these components can be interrelated. 
Finally, global food supply chains are characterized by the 
large variety of contractual forms used by private actors to 
structure those production chains.13  These can include the use 
forms for “spot markets” (that is, “commodities sold for cash 
and delivered immediately”), for marketing contracts (which 
often “[c]ontain estimates of the production under the contract 
and of delivery times and quantities”), for production contracts 
(where producers “agree[] to deliver a product produced in a 
6. See Gonzalo Gamboa et al., The Complexity of Food Systems: Defining Relevant
Attributes and Indicators for the Evaluation of Food Supply Chains in Spain, 8 
SUSTAINABILITY 515, at 2 (2016). 
7. Id. at 2. 
8. See id. at 7. 
9. Cf. id. 
10. Cf. id.
11. See Gamboa et al., supra note 6.
12. Cf. id.
13. See Pavel Vavra, OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Working Papers No. 16, 
Role, Usage and Motivation for Contracting in Agriculture 2 (2009). 
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manner set forth in the agreement”) and for governance via 
vertical integration (where a single firm “controls assets and 
production decisions in adjacent farming and processing 
stages.”).14  These different types of contractual forms can 
include a number of variations of terms within the forms 
themselves, involving different terms for production and sales 
standards, liability allocation, and sales timing.15  And—when 
food suppliers are concerned about sustainability or the 
appearance of sustainability—these terms can involve setting 
specific standards to reach desired sustainability goals.16 
These aspects of global supply chains have engendered 
distress among food sustainability activists, to the extent that 
one scholar has described the global food system as “literally 
killing us.”17  Among the concerns raised by activists and 
scholars are the impacts that global supply chains have on 
sustainability, including the lengthening of the supply chains 
and its impact on sustainability,18 the difficulty of tracking 
changes within supply chains and the resulting impact on 
sustainability,19 and lack of accountability within private supply 
chains.20 
Due to these considerations, activists and scholars, as well 
as various international organizations concerned about the 
sustainability of global food supply chains have focused on 
establishing a number of standards for food production.21  
14. See id. at 6.
15. See id. at 5. 
16. See id. at 6-7. 
17. Molly D. Anderson, Food Ethics Council, Why the Global Food System Is
Literally Killing Us, FOOD ETHICS COUNCIL: BLOG (June 2, 2018), https:// 
www.foodethicscouncil.org/ blog/ 166/ 19/ why- the- global- food- system- is- literally- 
killing- us/ [https://perma.cc/D673-RVXB]. 
18. See, e.g., The Future of Food and Agriculture, supra note 2, at 5 (stating that
“[t]he lengthening of food chains and changes in dietary patterns have further increased the 
resource-, energy-, and emission-intensity of the global food system.”) 
19. See, e.g., Volker Keiner, How To Create A Transparent, Sustainable Food
Supply Chain, DIGITALIST MAGAZINE (Sept. 13, 2016), http://www.digitalistmag.com/ 
digital-supply-networks/ 2016/ 09/ 13/ create- transparent-sustainable- food- supply- chain- 
04462240 [https://perma.cc/LG4Q-ZJG4] (describing concerns regarding supply chain 
traceability).  
20. See, e.g., M. Deblonde et al., An Ethical Toolkit for Food Companies:
Reflections on Its Use, 20 J. AGR. & ENVTL. ETHICS 99, 105 (2006) (describing the 
importance of accountability in designing ethical supply chains). 
21. See, e.g., Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development & Food &
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, OECD‑FAO Guidance for Responsible 
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Notable is the relatively recent Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) “Guidance for Responsible 
Agricultural Supply Chains.”22  This guidance, promulgated in 
2016, highlights a number of key aspects for consideration in 
building sustainable agricultural supply chains: human rights, 
labor rights, health and safety, food security and nutrition, tenure 
rights, animal welfare, environmental protection, governance, 
and technology and innovation.23  It focuses on procedural 
methods to incorporate these considerations into supply chains 
that purport to be sustainable.24  In particular, it recommends a 
few key steps to building sustainable agricultural supply chains: 
“[e]stablish[ing] strong enterprise management systems for 
responsible agricultural supply chains,” “[i]dentify[ing], 
assess[ing] and prioriti[zing] risks in the supply chain,” 
“[d]esign[ing] and implement[ing] a strategy to respond to 
identified risks,” “[v]erify[ing] supply chain due diligence,” and 
“[r]eport[ing] on supply chain due diligence.”25 
Similarly, the International Organization for 
Standardization, a private body that “develop[s] and publish[es] 
International Standards,”26 has recently promulgated standards 
for sustainable procurement (applicable also to food and 
agricultural sectors).27  This standard, known as ISO 20400, 
“aims to assist organisations in meeting their sustainability 
responsibilities by providing guidance as to the effective 
implementation of sustainable purchasing practices and 
Agricultural Supply Chains [hereinafter OECD-FAO Guidance] (2016), http:// 
mneguidelines.oecd.org/ OECD- FAO- Guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/2W86-Q96C]; 
International Organization for Standardization, ISO 20400, Sustainable Procurement 
[hereinafter ISO 20400: Sustainable Procurement] (2017); Miet Maertens & Johan 
Swinnen, Agricultural Trade and Development: A Value Chain Perspective, WTO 
Working Paper ERSD-2015-04 (April 2015), available at [https://perma.cc/MUP6-E5NQ], 
at 8 (describing the increasing use of private standards). 
22. OECD-FAO Guidance, supra note 21, at 13-23.
23. Id. at 26-29. 
24. See, e.g., id. at 31-33 (describing good assessment procedure practices, as well as
standard-setting processes and risk assessment and management processes). 
25. Id. at 31-38.
26. International Organization for Standardization, International Organization for
Standardization, https:// www.iso.org/ home. html [https://perma.cc/ZUM9-GMGB]. 
27. See ISO 20400: Sustainable Procurement, supra note 21.
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policies.”28  This private standard focuses on explaining the 
fundamentals of “sustainability,” and emphasizes the importance 
of incorporating standards for sustainability within supply 
chains.29  It also contains suggestions for management strategies 
and performance metrics that incorporate sustainability 
concerns.30 
Indeed, such standard-setting approaches have been 
adopted by a number of global actors.  McDonalds, for example, 
has adopted what it called their “Global Sustainability 
Framework,” which established “aspirational goals [for 2020] 
across a series of social and environmental topics in pillars 
[they] called Food, Planet and Sourcing.”31  Similarly, Unilever 
adopted a “Sustainable Living Plan,” with environmental goals 
that included halving “the greenhouse gas (GHG) impact of our 
products across the lifecycle by 2030,” halving “the water 
associated with the consumer use of [their] products by 2020,” 
halving “the waste associated with the disposal of [their] 
products by 2020,” and sourcing “100% of [their] agricultural 
raw materials sustainably” by 2020.32 
Such efforts, however, can raise concerns of 
“greenwashing,” a term used “to describe the deceptive use of 
‘green marketing’ to promote a misleading perception that a 
company’s policies, practices, products or services are 
environmentally friendly.”33  Without sufficient monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms for these sustainability initiatives, 
observers may have a difficult time assessing the actual effects 
of these initiatives on the environment.34 
28. Holding Redlich, A New Standard in Procurement—A Closer Look at ISO 
20400, LEXOLOGY (July 2017), https:// www.lexology.com/ library/ detail. aspx?g= 
6a2c4a73- 4afc- 497a- 9a4f- b1aa8d2b7625 [https://perma.cc/7QDT-8AEP]. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. McDonalds, Using Our Scale for Good, http:// corporate. mcdonalds.com/
corpmcd/ scale- for- good/ using- our- scale- for-good.html [https://perma.cc/6DR3-
RV9Y].  
32. Unilever, Sustainable Living: Water Use, https://www.unilever.com/sustainable-
living/reducing-environmental-impact/water-use// [https://perma.cc/7XMP-4MZ2]. 
33. Devika Kewalramani & Richard J. Sobelsohn, Are You Being Greenwashed?, 84 
N.Y. ST. B.J. 5 (June 2012). 
34. See, e.g., Sarfaty, supra note 5 at 426-27 (describing “existing voluntary
standards (e.g., OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, ILO’s Tripartite 
Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, and UN 
Global Compact) and self-regulation (e.g., codes of conduct) have been largely ineffective 
2018 COMPLEX, GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS 471 
As such, these types of general standards may be 
insufficient to fully reach goals of sustainability through private 
governance.  This is because the incorporation of such 
standards, while admirable, often fail to fully address the various 
supply chain features described earlier in this essay.  That is, the 
multiplicity of chain components, the complexity of supply 
chain interrelationships, and the diversity of private enforcement 
mechanisms can often mean that any failure to fully comply 
with adopted “sustainability standards” can be either overlooked 
or even impossible to ascertain.35  Instead, I argue that insights 
from the systems analysis literature might provide useful tools 
for better addressing these general concerns. 
II. AN INTRODUCTION TO SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
From a legal perspective, what is involved in a systems 
analysis approach to food chain sustainability?  To address this 
question, I draw from the approach of Donella Meadows, a 
pioneering environmental systems scholar.36  In her work, 
Thinking in Systems, she described a number of ways to think 
about environmental considerations from a systems analysis 
perspective.37 Using a systems analysis approach, Meadows 
pointed out that any system is comprised of three parts: its 
elements, its interconnectivities, and its function.38  Each of 
these—the elements, relationships, and their various functions – 
are important in terms of understanding how a particular system 
(such as the global food supply chain system) works.  
in shaping corporate behavior as they lack independent monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms and are thus subject to critiques of greenwashing.”); see also William S. 
Laufer, Social Accountability and Corporate Greenwashing. 43 J. BUS. ETHICS 253-61 
(2003). 
35. Cf. Jerry Davis, Can Global Supply Chains Be Accountable?, YALE GLOBAL 
ONLINE (May 2013), https:// yaleglobal.yale.edu/ content/ can- global- supply- chains- be- 
accountable[https://perma.cc/P27X-BGT4] (describing the difficulty that consumers have 
in holding supply chains accountable for their actual production processes). 
36. See The Donella Meadows Project, About Donella “Dana” Meadows, http://
donellameadows.org/ donella- meadows- legacy/ donella- dana- meadows/ 
[https://perma.cc/KV7C-PRMX] (describing her as “one of the most influential 
environmental thinkers of the twentieth century”); see also Wolfgang Sexon, Donella 
Meadows, 59, Author, And Advocate for Environment, NY TIMES  (Feb. 22, 2001), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/22/us/donella-meadows-59-author-and-advocate-for-
environment.html. 
37. See generally DONELLA MEADOWS, THINKING IN SYSTEMS (2008).
38. Id. at 11. 
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Nevertheless, this systems-based approach emphasizes 
interconnectivities and functions as more relevant towards 
deriving avenues for potential change than any sole focus on the 
elements of the system, which is the focus of many standard-
setting initiatives.39 
In turn, the systems analysis approach also focuses on 
systematic aspects rarely used in legal analysis, concepts such as 
stocks (which constitute elements of the system that can be 
measured or seen at any given time),40 flows (the actions which 
change the stocks over time),41 dynamics (the behavior of stocks 
and flows over time),42 and dynamic equilibria (equilibrium 
states that are reached through the dynamics of a system).43  
This kind of approach also introduces concepts such as feedback 
loops (mechanisms that—through the interaction of stocks and 
flows—lead to consistent behavior patterns over a long period of 
time),44 shifting dominance (changes in the impact of one 
feedback loop over others, when multiple feedback loops are 
present),45 resilience (a system’s ability to persist within a 
changing environment),46 and limiting factors (necessary inputs 
to systems that limit the activities of the system at particular 
moments).47  Again, these are the sorts of aspects that—as I’ve 
highlighted—are not emphasized in the standard-setting 
approaches developed recently in the food chain sustainability 
context.48 
In short, a systems analysis approach indicates that 
advocates who want to fully engage with structural issues should 
focus more on how components within a system—such as the 
global food supply chain system—operate and respond to 
change, rather than only focusing on standards for particular 
outputs or components.  This, in turn, can suggest that fruitful 
avenues for advocacy can involve not only the setting of 
39. Id. at 14-17.
40. Id. at 17-18.
41. Id. at 18-19.
42. MEADOWS, supra note 37, at 19-20. 
43. Id. at 21-22.
44. Id. at 25-27.
45. Id. at 44-45.
46. Id. at 76-78.
47. MEADOWS, supra note 37, at 100-03. 
48. See Redlich, supra note 28.
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standards for sustainable food chain management, but the 
strengthening of points within the system whereby advocates 
can have continuing effect. 
This is where the systems analysis concept of leverage 
points is especially fertile.49  In systems analysis, “leverage 
points” are points within complex systems “where a small shift 
in one thing can produce big changes in everything.”50  While 
there are no easy methods for identifying leverage points 
without inquiring into the particularities of individual systems,51 
systems scholars have at least developed principles for 
identifying the types of leverage points that are more effective at 
achieving change.52  Given this context, a systems approach to 
enhancing global food supply chain sustainability would 
emphasize not only the stocks and flows of the supply chains—
the focus of many standard-setting initiatives—but also 
incorporating leverage points whereby activists can continue to 
shift supply chains towards greater sustainability. 
III. IDENTIFYING KEY LEVERAGE POINTS WITHIN
GLOBAL FOOD SUPPLY CHAINS USING THE
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS APPROACH 
So, if sustainability advocates are to embrace the insights 
that systems analysis thinking provides regarding leverage 
points, upon what sorts of private governance mechanisms 
should advocates focus?  This Part provides a few suggestions, 
using various case studies, mostly from the fair labor arena, to 
illustrate how the incorporation of certain supply chain 
governance mechanisms can be used by sustainability activists 
to leverage the promotion of sustainability.  In particular, this 
Part emphasizes traceability, transparency, third-party 
enforceability, and adaptability mechanisms as leverage points 
that warrant further study and potential advocacy.  In discussing 
the case studies, this essay also examines how these leverage 
points often work in synergy with each other, and thus, how 
49. See DONELLA MEADOWS, Leverage Points: Places to Intervene in a System
(1999), available at [https://perma.cc/XB96-8Q3Z]. 
50. Id. at 1.
51. Id. at 2.
52. Id. at 3.
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adoption of any single leverage point alone may be insufficient 
to shift supply chains towards greater sustainability. 
Traceability in supply chains constitutes the ability of 
actors to track the overall supply chain components.53  A 
number of definitions for traceability exist,54 but the idea of 
traceability is the ability to follow the movement of food 
through its various stages of production, processing, and 
distribution.55  Traceability can provide both informational 
benefits, by way of systematically tracking the sources and 
movement of components of supply chains, as well as 
accountability benefits, if such tracking information is made 
publicly available.56  With respect to incorporating sustainability 
into supply chains, implementing traceability mechanisms can 
allow producers to identify unsustainable links within supply 
chains, and also address any concerns that may arise if new 
reports shed light on the unsustainable practices of certain 
suppliers.  This is an especially important leverage point from 
the global food supply chain perspective, given the 
characteristics of the diversity of components and structural 
complexity described earlier.57  Without the incorporation of 
traceability mechanisms, sustainability advocates will face 
significant hurdles in assessing the sustainability performance of 
many supply chains. 
One example of a traceability initiative is the International 
Tin Supply Chain Initiative, a program that assists companies 
with due diligence and the responsible sourcing of minerals 
from high-risk areas.58  The Initiative is implemented through 
53. See, e.g., Pam Ly, Targeting the Conflict Minerals Trade: Corporate Social
Responsibility Governance and the Multilateral System, 25 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & 
DISP. RESOL. 25, 38-40 (2017) (describing traceability mechanisms for conflict minerals 
chains); Andrea Migone & Michael Howlett, From Paper Trails to DNA Barcodes: 
Enhancing Traceability in Forest and Fishery Certification, 52 NAT. RESOURCES J. 421 
(2012) (describing traceability mechanisms in forest and fisheries product chains). 
54. See Migone & Howlett, supra note 53, at 424 n.14.
55. See, e.g., Council Regulation 178/2002, 2002 O.J. (L 31) 1 (EC); Codex 
Alimentarius Commission (defining traceability as “the ability to follow the movement of a 
food through specified stage(s) of production, processing and distribution.”). 
56. Myo Min Aung & Yoon Seok Chang, Traceability in a Food Supply Chain:
Safety and Quality Perspectives, 39 FOOD. CONTROL J. 173, 173 (2014). 
57. Id. 
58. International Tin Supply Chain Initiative, The ITSCI Programme for Responsible
Mineral Supply Chains, https://www.itsci.org/ [https://perma.cc/YD6L-6YWG]. 
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the collaboration of governmental authorities, companies and 
civil society organizations.59  One of its key features is the 
implementation of traceability mechanisms.  As described by the 
Initiative itself, 
Once a mine is identified and approved, traceability is 
implemented by the relevant government agents. ITSCI 
issues tags to those government agents for use at the 
approved sites, and the agents record relevant data 
associated with each bag of mineral as the tags are applied. 
The agents are regularly on site and are responsible for 
assuring the source of minerals tagged. Similar data 
recording takes place at processor and exporter locations 
and all data is transmitted, either by internet or phone 
network to the ITSCI data centre where it is verified and 
checked for errors and anomalies. ITSCI field teams 
support the government by training agents and following up 
on any potential issues of fraud or other challenges.60 
This Initiative has won a number of awards for spurring 
and improving the use of traceability mechanisms for tin-based 
supply chains.61  Concerns, however, have been raised regarding 
the limited focus of the Initiative (to tin), and the lack of third-
party audits to verify “conflict-free” claims.62  Nevertheless, the 
Initiative has been praised for “facilitat[ing] compliance with 
[some disclosure provisions of the Dodd Frank Act.]”63 
Public transparency in supply chains can also provide a 
useful leverage point for sustainability advocates.  Transparency 
can include providing public access to sourcing data, third-party 
audit information, or even annual assessments of sustainability 
59. International Tin Supply Chain Initiative, Purpose, https:// www.itsci.org/
purpose/ [https://perma.cc/J9US-KP58]. 
60. International Tin Supply Chain Initiative, About, https://www.itsci.org/about-
itsci/ [https://perma.cc/E5RS-NY6P]. 
61. One of the most recent awards was from edie, a UK-based site for environmental
science and management news.  See, e.g., ITRI wins edie Sustainable Supply Chains 
Leader 2017 (Jan. 27, 2017), https:// www.itsci.org/ 2017/ 01/ 27/ itri- wins- edie- 
sustainable- supply- chains- leader- 2017/ [https://perma.cc/62RX-6NBX]. 
62. See, e.g., Melissa Pistilli, Conflict Minerals: ITRI Supply Chain Initiative Fails
to Address Major Issues, TANTALUM INVESTING NEWS (Apr. 2010), 
https://investingnews.com/ daily/ resource-investing/ critical- metals-investing/ tantalum- 
investing/ conflict- minerals- itri- supply- chain- initiative- fails- to- address- major- issues/ 
[https://perma.cc/Z56W-X3JA]. 
63. See Ly, supra note 53, at 447.
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metrics within a supply chain.64  Without transparency 
mechanisms, it can be difficult to hold corporate actors 
accountable for unsustainable production methods, even if there 
is public demand to do so.65  Even traceability initiatives, such 
as that of the International Tin Supply Chain Initiative, may not 
successfully address sustainability concerns if that information 
is not made publicly available to stakeholders who wish to hold 
corporate actors accountable for enhancing sustainability.66  
Again, given the diversity of components and complexity of 
supply chains, transparency is necessary for advocates to 
leverage sustainable changes within global food supply chains. 
At this point, I should also add a cautionary note: I do not 
suggest that transparency provisions alone are sufficient for 
advocates to leverage greater sustainability out of global supply 
chains.  As a number of scholars have observed, the information 
provided through various transparency and disclosure 
mechanisms is often hard for consumers and investors to follow; 
moreover, advocates are not necessarily able to launch effective 
boycotts of suppliers who disclose negative information.67  
64. See, e.g., Naomi Jiyoung Bang, Casting a Wide Net to Catch the Big Fish: A
Comprehensive Initiative to Reduce Human Trafficking in the Global Seafood Chain, 17 U. 
PA. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 221, 244, 251, 254 (2014).  
65. See id. at 221 (“With no clear-cut international or national enforcement
mechanisms to monitor the integrity of supply chains, little risk of punishment, diminishing 
courses of action in court, and a fragmented consumer base to hold corporations 
accountable, corporations have little incentive to maintain transparency in their supply 
chains.”); Sophia Eckert, The Business Transparency on Trafficking and Slavery Act: 
Fighting Forced Labor in Complex Global Supply Chains, 12 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 383, 383 
(2013) (“Global corporate supply chains have become increasingly complex networks that 
provide little to no transparency. This lack of transparency poses a very real challenge to 
uncovering forced labor in market activities.”) 
66. See, e.g., Adam S. Chilton & Galit A. Sarfaty, The Limitations of Supply Chain
Disclosure Regimes, 53 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 5 (2017).  
67. See id. at’ 5-6 (“[H]uman rights-related supply chain disclosures are likely to be
uniquely difficult to interpret because they do not provide information on the actual 
number of human rights abuses a company has committed. They instead only provide 
information on the level of due diligence companies conduct to minimize the risk of human 
rights violations in their supply chains. Finally, it is difficult for consumers and experts 
alike to assess the probability of human rights abuse in a given company’s supply chain 
because the levels of risk vary considerably based on a company’s size, industry, the 
country in which it operates, the number of tiers of suppliers in its supply chain, and the 
total number of suppliers. Taken together, these features of supply chain disclosures make 
them likely to be even less effective than disclosures in other contexts.”); Marcia Narine, 
Disclosing Disclosure’s Defects: Addressing Corporate Irresponsibility for Human Rights 
Impacts, 47 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 84, 84-85 (2015) (“However, evidence shows that 
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Instead, I argue for advocates to press for supplier adoption of 
transparency mechanisms in conjunction with the other leverage 
points discussed in this essay.  That is, while transparency 
mechanisms alone may not provide sufficient leverage for 
sustainability (due to the other considerations discussed by 
observers) they are nevertheless critical for use with other 
leverage points. 
One example of a corporate initiative is the Nike 
Transparency Initiative.68  Using both interactive maps and other 
reporting, Nike has disclosed more than 220 reports available on 
factory inspections conducted by third parties.69  While critiques 
have still been raised regarding Nike’s substantive labor 
practices, Nike—due to this initiative—has nevertheless been 
praised as “com[ing] a long way.”70 
The incorporation of third-party participation mechanisms 
within global supply chains is the final potential leverage point 
that this essay argues should be the focus of sustainability 
advocates.  As observers have demonstrated, neither traceability 
nor transparency alone—although moderately successful at 
advancing sustainability goals— have fully addressed fair labor 
concerns within supply chains, and there is no reason to suspect 
that the context of sustainability would be any different.71 
One major success in this area has been the Coalition of 
Immokalee ’Workers’ Fair Food Program,72 deemed the “best 
disclosures generally fail to change behavior because: (1) there are too many of them; (2) 
stakeholders suffer from disclosure overload; and (3) not enough consumers or investors 
penalize companies by boycotting products or divesting.”). 
68.  Nike, Nike Aims to Transform Manufacturing, 
https://about.nike.com/pages/transform-manufacturing [https://perma.cc/9B62-2KS7] 
(“The Nike Manufacturing Map discloses the names, locations and demographic 
information about the workforce at the factories we contract to make our product, and 
holds us accountable for our chosen source base.”); see also Nike, Nike Manufacturing 
Map, http://manufacturingmap.nikeinc.com/ [https://perma.cc/ZG8T-V4SF] (providing an 
interactive map). 
69. Fair Labor Association, Nike, Inc., http://www.fairlabor.org/affiliate/nike-inc
(disclosing 221 third party inspection reports on Nike factories around the world). 
70. See Simon Birch, How Activism Forced Nike to Change Its Ethical Game, THE 
GUARDIAN (July 6, 2012), https:// www.theguardian.com/ environment/ green- living- 
blog/ 2012/ jul/ 06/activism-nike [https://perma.cc/L8BY-PYUM]. 
71. Adam S. Chilton & Galit A. Sarfaty, The Limitations of Supply Chain Disclosure
Regimes, 53 Stan. J. Int’l L. 1, 20-22 (2017). 
72. See generally Fair Food Program, About the Fair Food Program,
http://www.fairfoodprogram.org/ [https://perma.cc/3MGZ-RURT]. 
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workplace-monitoring program” by the New York Times.73  
This Program was initiated in 2011 by the Coalition of 
Immokalee Workers, a grassroots farmworker organization, to 
address labor abuses in the tomato grower industry.74  The Fair 
Food Program works through a Code of Conduct that must be 
adopted by members of the program.75  Notably, the Code of 
Conduct does not merely include the adoption of fair labor 
standards (such as zero tolerance for forced labor and assault), 
but also the requirement that employers under the Fair Food 
Program both (1) create “worker-triggered complaint resolution 
mechanism[s] leading to complaint investigation[s], corrective 
action plans, and, if necessary, suspension of a farm’s 
Participating Grower status, and thereby its ability to sell to 
Participating Buyers,” and (2) allow “[o]ngoing auditing of the 
farms by the Fair Food Standards Council to insure compliance 
with each element of the program.”76 
The worker-driven, participatory aspects of this program 
have been praised by many scholars.77  In particular, scholars 
observe that  
73. Steven Greenhouse, In Florida Tomato Fields, a Penny Buys Progress, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 24, 2014). 
74. Greg Asbed & Steve Hitov, Preventing Forced Labor in Corporate Supply
Chains: The Fair Food Program and Worker-Driven Social Responsibility, 52 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 497, 498 (2017). 
75. Fair Food Standards Council, Fair Food Code of Conduct, http://
www.fairfoodstandards.org/ resources/ fair- food- code- of- conduct/ 
[https://perma.cc/NR6P-AWWK]. 
76. Fair Food Standards Council, Frequently Asked Questions, http:// www.
fairfoodstandards.org/ resources/ frequently-asked-questions/ [https://perma.cc/BXX8-
DXVV]; see also Fair Foods Standards Council, Fair Food Code of Conduct, supra note 
75, Part I.15 (“Each Participating Grower will inform Qualifying Workers of their right to 
use the complaint resolution process operated by the FFSC, and may also establish a 
complaint resolution process of its own that is acceptable to the FFSC. Participating 
Growers will not attempt to impede in any way the investigation of a complaint by the 
FFSC on behalf of a Qualifying Worker, and will not engage in or permit retribution or 
retaliation of any kind against a Qualifying Worker for seeking to file or having filed a 
complaint.”). 
77. See, e.g., Asbed & Hitov, supra note 74, at 521-24 (highlighting the complaints
mechanism of the Fair Food Program); Kishanthi Parella, Outsourcing Corporate 
Accountability, 89 WASH. L. REV. 747, 809-15 (2014) (praising the shift from “unilateral” 
to “bilateral” (meaning stakeholder inclusiveness) strategies for corporate social 
responsibility); Greg Asbed & Sean Sellers, The Fair Food Program: Comprehensive, 
Verifiable and Sustainable Change For Farmworkers, 16 U. PA. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 39, 
46 (2013) (“When workers encounter a potential Code violation, the FFP provides them 
access, protected access, with strict consequences for retaliation—to a fast, effective and 
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“[m]any buyers concentrate on setting standards (through 
corporate codes) and monitoring (through audits) but do not 
provide local managers with the support to implement the 
necessary changes.  The weakness of audits is that they 
measure non-compliance but they generally fail to provide 
local management with the tools to make the necessary 
improvements. . . . The way to correct these incentives is to 
adopt an alternative model for corporate social 
responsibility that rejects a unilateral, buyer-driven, top-
down approach in favor of a partnership model for 
improving CSR in the value chain.78 
In conjunction with traceability and transparency 
mechanisms, the incorporation of third party participation 
mechanisms can create a critical leverage point for sustainability 
advocates.79  These mechanisms need not take the complaints-
driven approach used in the Fair Food Program.80  Rather, such 
participation mechanisms can take the form of contractually 
required opportunities for third-party monitoring, a regular 
requirement for third-party consultation in the development of 
standards and corporate governance policies, or even the express 
incorporation of third-party beneficiary enforcement 
mechanisms within supply chain contracts themselves.81  Given 
the large variety of contractual forms used in global supply 
chain sourcing contracts outlined earlier (leading to often-
obscured standard-setting through those contracts), such general 
third party participation opportunities can provide critical 
leverage points for advocates to exert pressure on supply chains 
to reach goals of sustainability.82 
IV. CONCLUSION
proven complaint process. The complaint procedure is essential to managing risks before 
they become bigger problems, and the growers who have truly embraced the Fair Food 
Program understand the benefit of this.”). 
78. Parella, supra note 77, at 808-09. 
79. JASON POTTS, MATTHEW LYNCH, ANN WILKINGS, GABRIEL HUPPE, MAXINE
CUNNINGHAM & VIVEK VOORA, THE STATE OF SUSTAINABILITY INITIATIVES REVIEW 
2014, 27, 52, 164, 181, 325 (2014).   
80. Fair Food Program 2014 Annual Report, Fair Food Standard Council (2014).
81. Principles for Responsible Contracts: Integrating the Management of Human
Rights Risks Into State—Investor Contract Negotiations, United Nations, 28, 33-34. ’’ 
82. Id. at 1, 28, 33-34.
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This essay intended to provide a sketch of how 
sustainability advocates can use structural changes, rather than 
standard-setting, to incorporate leverage points into supply chain 
governance.  This is not to suggest that any struggle to 
encourage suppliers to adopt such leverage points will be easy; 
after all, such measures will open suppliers to additional 
scrutiny, which may be considered undesirable.  However, the 
case studies I’ve described suggest that the incorporation of 
leverage points can be achievable in practice. 
Future legal work is still necessary, however, to build 
model contractual language to better incorporate such structures 
into supply chain policies and purchasing agreements; grassroots 
advocates may not have the resources and capacities to do that 
alone.  And again, because of the variety of contractual forms 
that govern global food supply chains, a modular approach to 
developing such model terms may be warranted.  This essay 
ends with a call for legal scholars interested in supply chain 
sustainability to devote greater attention to developing such 
provisions, and thereby, enhancing the ability of advocates to 
provide concrete suggestions in their advocacy efforts. 
